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NOTES
NAMEN: RIPARIAN RIGHTS ON FLATHEAD LAKE
INTRODUCTION
Do the owners of riparian' property, acquired from the United
States as trustee for an Indian Tribe, have access and wharfage2 rights
to the navigable waters? This question was considered for the first time
in Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen.3
The defendants4 in the case were the owners through successive
conveyances of a portion of property fronting Flathead Lake which
had originally been allotted to an individual member of one of the In-
dian tribes occupying the Flathead Indian Reservation.5 The defend-
ant James M. Namen operated a marina on the land and had erected
and maintained docks, wharves, a breakwater, and a storage shed
which extended beyond the high-water mark of the lake.6
The Tribes7 instituted an action in trespass and requested the court
1. "Riparian rights" are the rights of the owners of lands on the banks of water-
courses, relating to the water, its use, ownership of soil under the stream, accretions, etc.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1490 (4th ed. 1951). "Riparian" has been defined as "belonging
or relating to the bank of a river;, of or on the bank." It is also used coextensively with
"littoral," which is the more accurate term when referring to the shore of a lake or shore of
the sea or tidal water. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1490 (4th ed. 1951).
2. "Access" has been defined as an "approach, or the means, power, or opportunity of
approaching," and when applied to navigable waters, this means the right of the landowner
to enter the water and then return to his property. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 28 (4th ed.
1951). "Wharfage" has been defined as the "right to the exclusive use of submerged lands as
by the affixing thereto or the establishment thereon of a permanent structure to some point
within the navigable body of water, deep and wide enough to dock.. . vessels." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1767 (4th ed. 1951). It should be noted that the dispute in this case con-
cerned the rights of such access and wharfage which went beyond and below the high-water
mark of the lake. The court had determined as a matter of law that the defendants' property
extended only to the high-water mark of the lake. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
v. Namen, 380 F. Supp. 452, 457 (D. Mont. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976).
3. 380 F. Supp. 452 (D. Mont. 1974), aft'd, 534 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 929 (1976).
4. Defendants included James M. Namen, Barbara J. Namen, A.J. Namen, and
Kathryn Namen, the owners of the land located in Poison, Montana. The City of Poison
was permitted to intervene and filed an answer. The Flathead Lakers, Inc. was granted
leave to file a brief as amicus curiae. Id. at 455.
5. The original allotment had been made to Antoine Morias (Indian Allotment No.
1378) in 1908 pursuant to the Act of April 23, 1904, 33 Stat. 302. The defendants later
acquired a portion of that allotment. Id. at 456.
6. The parties were unable to agree upon the actual elevation of the high-water mark,
so it was agreed that for the purposes of this action, any reference to a stated elevation
"should be considered altered to merely state at the high-water mark at whatever it may be."
Id. at 455.
7. The plaintiffs included The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flat-
head Reservation and Harold W. Mitchell, Jr., chairman of the Tribal Council. Id. at 455.
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to order the defendants to remove those structures and return the lands
below the high-water mark to their original condition. The court re-
viewed the various acts and treaties of Congress related to the reserva-
tion, considered the long established common law principles
controlling riparian rights, and concluded that Congress had intended
to include riparian rights in the issuance of patents for the allotted
lands. The defendants were granted partial summary judgment.8 The
issue of whether the structures maintained by the defendants consti-
tuted an excessive exercise of those riparian rights was left to be consid-
ered at a later hearing.9
The decision does not reflect a change in existing law, but rather
the first treatment of this precise question.' ° The case provides a
unique and important analysis and integration of three complex legal
issues which are of concern in any state containing federally held wa-
ters and Indian reservations. The purpose of this note is to reorganize
and supplement the court's treatment of these issues: (1) who has juris-
diction over the bed and banks of navigable waters held by the United
States in trust for the Indian tribes? (2) what is the federal common law
regarding the riparian rights of access and wharfage on navigable wa-
ters? and, (3) what Congressional intent concerning riparian rights is
manifested by the various treaties and allotment acts affecting the Flat-
head Indian Reservation?
ORIGIN OF THE ISSUE: TREATIES AND ACTS
As white settlement progressed throughout the West in the 1800's,
Congress was forced to impose treaties on various Indian tribes.I The
Flathead Indian Reservation was created in July 1855, pursuant to the
Treaty of Hellgate.' 2 Within its boundaries was included the southern
half of Flathead Lake.' 3 As part of that treaty, the President was given
the power to assign lots to individual Indians and sell the remaining
land to non-Indians. 14
The Treaty of the Upper Missouri' 5 was signed three months after
the Hellgate Treaty. Its terms dealt with the tribes and territory of the
Upper Missouri and Yellowstone Rivers, including the Flathead Indian
Reservation. Although some mention was made of navigation on lakes
8. Id. at 467.
9. Id. See note 74 infra.
10. Id. at 465.
11. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970).
12. Act of June 16, 1855, 12 Stat. 975.
13. Id. Art. I.
14. Id. Art. VI.
15. Act of Oct. 17, 1855, 11 Stat. 657.
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and rivers in the affected territory,' 6 neither this treaty nor the Hellgate
Treaty contained any express provisions concerning riparian rights.' 7
Starting with the General Allotment Act of 188718 and continuing
with seven subsequent acts and amendments, Congress implemented
the general policy of alloting tribal lands to individual Indians and sell-
ing the remainder to non-Indians. 9 In 1934, the allotment policy was
terminated by the Indian Reorganization Act,20 which was enacted to
organize the tribes and conserve and develop Indian lands and re-
sources. By then, however, substantial portions of the Flathead Reser-
vation had been allotted to individual Indians and subsequently
transferred to non-Indians, thus setting the stage for Namen.
APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Federal, state, and tribal law compete for control on Indian reser-
vations. One of the primary issues in Namen was whether tribal or
federal law governs the use of the bed and banks of the southern half of
Flathead Lake.2'
The determination of which law applies depends on who holds ti-
tle to the bed and banks of the waters under dispute. The basic policies
controlling passage of title to the bed and banks of navigable waters in
a territory as it becomes a state were established in Shively v. Bowlby.22
The fundamental rules are: (1) the United States takes and holds title
to lands below the high-water mark for the benefit of the public, and in
trust for the future states to be created from a territory, and (2) upon
admission of a state to the Union, the state shall gain full title to and
control of the bed and banks of its navigable waters.23 Consequently,
16. Id. Art. VIII.
17. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 459.
18. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
19. The relevant provisions of the acts and amendments are: 1904 Allotment Act, Apr.
23, 1904, ch. 1495, 33 Stat. 302 (General Allotment Act specifically applied to Flathead
Reservation); Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325, 354 (generally amended the 1904
Allotment Act to implement policy of allotment); Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, 35 Stat. 444
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 404 (1976)) (allowed Indian allottees to sell their allotments to non-
Indians); Villa Sites Act, Apr. 12, 1910, ch. 156, 36 Stat. 296-97 (provided for subdivision
and sale of lots fronting on Flathead Lake); Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 210, 36 Stat. 1066, and
Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 388, 37 Stat. 527 (patents for tracts of land on Flathead Lake made
subject to easements for irrigation); Act of Feb. 28, 1919, ch. 70, 40 Stat. 1203 (provided for
designation of surplus land bordering streams within the reservation as valuable for stock
watering purposes, and allowed disposal of lands under the terms of the 1904 Act). None of
the acts or amendments either grant or reserve riparian rights in regard to lake frontage
property. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 460.
20. Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization) Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat.
984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1976)).
21. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 462.
22. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
23. Id. at 48-49.
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state law generally controls the nature and extent of riparian rights in
the bed and banks of navigable waters within its jurisdiction.24 Namen
presents an exception, however, because title to the bed and banks of
the southern half of Flathead Lake below the high-water mark is held
by the federal government in trust for the Indian tribes.25 Since title
does not rest in the state, it has no jurisdiction and state law does not
apply.26 The question is therefore limited to whether federal or tribal
law governs.
Acknowledging the fact that state law did not apply in this case,
the Tribes attempted to extend the rule of Shi'ey to say that the Tribes
stood in the same position as a state with respect to the ownership and
control of the bed and banks of the southern half of Flathead Lake.27
The court was unwilling to accept this analogy, however, primarily be-
cause the Tribes did not hold legal title to the bed and banks of naviga-
ble waters within the reservation. Rather, it was held by the United
States Government in trust for the Tribes. 28 The court said that the
absence of legal ownership caused the Tribes' position to be more
nearly that of a territory than a state, and federal law should therefore
govern the disputed riparian rights.29
Two further arguments were offered by the Tribes to support their
contention that tribal law applied to their case. First, they offered two
letters from the Commission of Indian Affairs concerning the right of
the Tribes to grant leases for the use of lands below the high-water
mark on the southern half of Flathead Lake.30 Both letters referred to
the Tribes' complete authority to control the use of those lands.3 ' The
court acknowledged the principle that interpretations of a law by an
agency responsible for its enforcement are to be given deference.32 But
since these letters were written nearly fifty years after the original allot-
ments and conveyances of the land and since neither considered the
federal common law principles of access and wharfage nor the effect of
prior allotments and conveyances, the court decided the letters were not
persuasive.33 Instead, the court stated that the Congressional intent to
retain control of the land and grant riparian rights was clearly indi-
cated in the legislative history of the allotment acts, particularly the
24. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 461.
25. Montana Power Co. v. Rochester, 127 F.2d 189, 191 (9th Cir. 1942).
26. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 461.
27. Id. at 462.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 463.
31. .d.
32. Id. at 463, citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 18 (1965).
33. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 463.
[Vol. I
NAMEN
Villa Sites Act of 191031 and a bulletin issued in connection with the
sale of the villa sites. The bulletin stated that "the shores [of Flathead
Lake] are well adapted for boat landings and the erection of
wharves. 3
5
The final argument in support of the applicability of tribal law was
based on a provision of the Hellgate Treaty which set apart the Flat-
head Reservation for the "exclusive use and benefit" of the Tribes.
36
Noting the power of Congress to grant titles including riparian rights
on trust land, the court stated that the fact that the lands are held in
trust for the Tribes did not necessarily compel the conclusion that In-
dian law, rather than federal common law, was applicable.37 In sup-
port of this position, the court cited two related federal court decisions.
In Dalton v. Hazelez38 the court held that the beds of navigable lakes
and rivers in the former territory of Alaska were held in trust by the
United States for the state of Alaska. Similar rationale was applied in
United States v. Groen,39 where the court held that the beds of naviga-
ble waters within the District of Columbia were held in trust by the
United States "for the benefit of the people."'  In both cases the courts
recognized the private rights of access and wharfage as well as the prin-
ciple that when the Federal Government holds title, federal law will
control.4 '
As a final note, the court cited three additional cases related to the
subject of federal grants of Indian land.42 Although these cases dealt
with boundaries and accretion, questions normally governed by federal
law even when state law governs riparian rights, the court stated that
they further support the proposition that "federal common law is ap-
plied to determine the extent of federal grants of Indian land."'43
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
After the jurisdictional issues were resolved, the court was faced
with two remaining questions. First, what is the federal common law
with respect to the riparian rights of access and wharfage? Second, did
34. Act of April 12, 1910, ch. 156, 36 Stat. 296-97.
35. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 463.
36. Act of June 16, 1855, Art. II, 12 Stat. at 975.
37. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 464.
38. 182 F. 561, 572 (9th Cir. 1910).
39. 72 F. Supp. 713 (D.D.C. 1947).
40. Id. at 719.
41. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 464.
42. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922); Fontenelle v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska,
430 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1970); Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
43. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 465.
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Congress intend that these particular allotted lands should be subject to
that law?
The federal common law case history in this area is extensive and
consistent. As early at 1861, the Supreme Court held that the riparian
rights of access and wharfage were property rights and were therefore
incidental to the ownership of lands riparian to navigable waters.'
Under common law, the riparian owner had rights superior to the gen-
eral public in publicly owned submerged land so far as use of the sub-
merged land was necessary to make full use of his riparian rights.45
This right of access to navigable water eventually developed into a
common law right to extend a wharf out to navigable water over sub-
merged land.46 As stated in Yates v. Milwaukee,47 this right included
the riparian owner's "access to the navigable part of the river from the
front of his lot, and the right to make a landing, wharf or pier for his
use or for the use of the public. ' 48 In every case in which title to the
bed and banks of navigable waters is held by the Federal Government,
federal common law has been applied to grant the rights of access and
wharfage.49
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Even after resolving the jurisdictional and federal common law
issues, it was still necessary for the court to ascertain whether Congress
intended that the allottees and purchasers of the lakeshore property
would acquire the riparian rights of access and wharfage.50 The evalu-
ation of all relevant laws, acts, treaties, and executive orders is essential
44. Dutton v. Strong, 66 U.S. 23 (1861).
45. Bums v. Forbes, 412 F.2d 995 (3rd Cir. 1969); County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90
U.S. 46 (1874).
46. United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926).
47. 77 U.S. 497 (1861).
48. Id. at 504; See also Martin v. Standard Oil of New Jersey, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 84,
198 F.2d 523, 526 (1952); United States v. Groen, 72 F. Supp. 713, 720 (D.D.C. 1947);
United States v. Belt, 79 U.S. App. D.C. 87, 142 F.2d 761, 767 (1944).
49. Potomac Steamboat Co. v. Upper Potomac Steamboat Co., 109 U.S. 672 (1884);
Ketchikan Spruce Mills v. Alaska Concrete Prod. Co., 113 F. Supp. 700 (D. Alaska 1953);
Worthen Lumber Mills v. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 229 F. 966, 970 (9th Cir. 1916);
Dalton v. Hazelez, 182 F. 561, 573 (9th Cir. 1910); Decker v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 164 F.
974, 976 (9th Cir. 1908); Columbia Canning Co. v. Hampton, 161 F. 60, 64 (9th Cir. 1908).
Even though the rights of access and wharfage will normally be incidental to ownership of
land riparian to federally held bed and banks of navigable waters, those rights may still be
limited by state laws imposed to protect the rights and safety of the public. Yates, 77 U.S. at
504; River Rouge, 269 U.S. at 418. Even when a state does limit those rights by statute,
however, federal rules will apply if title can be traced to a federal grant made prior to state-
hood. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
50. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 465.
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to the determination of federal policy toward particular Indian tribes."
Namen provided the first opportunity to perform this analysis when
considering the riparian rights of owners who acquire their property
through the United States as trustee for an Indian tribe.
5 2
The construction and interpretation of treaties and statutes con-
cerning Indians is guided by a series of cases designed primarily to pro-
tect Indian rights. 3 In its analysis of the Congressional history
surrounding the creation and management of the Flathead Reserva-
tion, the court was required to consider each act and treaty in light of
four basic judicial rules of interpretation: (1) ambiguous expressions in
treaties must be resolved in favor of the Indians;5 4 (2) treaties must be
interpreted as the Indians themselves would have foreseen and under-
stood them; (3) Indian treaties must be liberally construed in favor of
the Indians;56 and, (4) Indian treaties must be construed in light of their
purpose.-7
As indicated previously, neither of the treaties affecting the reser-
vation contain any express provisions concerning riparian rights.5 8 Al-
though the Hellgate Treaty provides that "free access .. . to the
nearest public highway shall be secured to them. . . "I' and navigable
rivers have been statutorily "deemed public highways,"60 the court re-
fused to accept this as an implied grant of riparian rights. Following
the above rules of interpretation, the court declined to interpret the
word "them" to mean the general public, and in addition, held that the
Indians would not have understood "public highway" to mean the
southern half of Flathead Lake.6'
The Hellgate Treaty also states that "the navigation of all lakes
and streams shall be forever free to citizens of the United States."6 2
The court held that this statement was nothing more than a recognition
of the public's right of navigation, and distinguished that right from the
51. Stevens v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 452 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1971); Kirk-
wood v. Arenas, 243 F.2d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1957).
52. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 465.
53. Wilkinson, A Summary of the Law ofAmerican Indian Treaties, MANUAL OF IN-
DIAN LAw, J-8 (M. West ed. 1977).
54. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Com-
mission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
55. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
56. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 418 (1943).
57. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 571 (1908); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546, 590 (1963).
58. See note 15 supra.
59. Act of June 16, 1855, Art. III, 12 Stat. at 976.
60. 43 U.S.C. § 931 (1976); 33 U.S.C. § 10 (1976).
61. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 458.
62. Act of June 16, 1855, Art. VIII., 12 Stat. at 976.
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private rights of access and wharfage.6"
In determining the effect of Congressional acts subsequent to an
Indian treaty, a court is constrained by the principle that while the
power to abrogate treaty rights exists, "the intention to abrogate or
modify a treaty is not to be lighly imputed to the Congress."'  Despite
this rule to narrowly construe such acts, the courts cannot ignore the
intention of Congress where it is perfectly plain.65 As stated previously,
none of the allotment acts applicable to the Flathead Reservation ei-
ther granted or reserved the riparian rights of access and wharfage.66
The Villa Sites Act of 191067 provided for the subdivision and sale of
all the unallotted lands fronting Flathead Lake inside the Flathead
Reservation. An advertising bulletin issued by the Department of the
Interior in connection with those sales stated that "the shores are well
adapted for boat landings and the erection of wharves. '68 Although
the portion of land owned by Namen had been allotted prior to the
Villa Sites Act and the associated bulletin, the patents issued pursuant
to the Villa Sites Act contain the same provisions as those under the
1904 Act which governed the original allotment of the Namen prop-
erty.6
9
The Tribes claimed that because Congress failed to expressly grant
riparian rights, they could not be implied, basing their contention on
two basic rules of Indian law: (1) only Congress has the power to abro-
gate Indian property rights, 0 and (2) statutes in derogation of Indian
property rights must be narrowly construed. 1 Recognizing these rules,
the court nevertheless held that by means of the allotment acts Con-
gress expressed its intent to exercise its dominant power over the Indian
lands by allotting them to individual Indians and non-Indians.72 By
virtue of the references to wharves in the Villa Sites Act, the apparent
continuity of that act with previous acts, and the consistent federal
common law policy of designating the riparian rights of access and
wharfage as property rights, the court concluded that Congress in-
tended to include those rights in the patents of the lakeshore allot-
ments.
73
63. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 459.
64. Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934).
65. United States v. Seaton, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 234, 248 F.2d 154, 155 (1957).
66. See note 19 supra.
67. Supra. fn. 34.
68. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 463.
69. Id.
70. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903).
71. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
72. Namen, 380 F. Supp. at 464.
73. Id. at 464, 466.
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CONCLUSION
The most significant development provided by the Namen decision
is the rule that federal law will determine the nature and extent of ripa-
ian rights, and other federal grants, in all cases in which the national
government holds title to the bed and banks of navigable waters in
trust for an Indian tribe. This aspect of the decision has already been
cited with approval in two subsequent federal appellate court deci-
sions74 and promises to have a significant impact on future litigation in
the area. The court's analysis of federal common law concerning the
riparian rights of access and wharfage does not change previous law,
but instead provides a comprehensive and conclusive summary of the
nature of those rights. The court also indicates that express provisions
in patents for trust property or in acts of Congress are not required to
grant riparian rights to the owners. This last determination could have
major implications in modem litigation based on original Indian trea-
ties and subsequent reservation management legislation. Finally, and
most importantly, the decision firmly establishes the principles that will
apply when the issues presented in Namen are faced simultaneously in
future litigation.
C.K.S.
74. United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'g395 F. Supp. 205 (D.
Mont. 1975); Omaha Indian Tribe v. Wilson, 575 F.2d 620, 630 (8th Cir. 1978), vacating, 433
F. Supp. 67 (N.D. Iowa 1977), rev'd and remanded, 61 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1979). In Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, No. 2343; City of Poison v. Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes, No. 75-143-M; and United States v. City of Poison, No. 77-70-M, (D.
Mont., Sept. 20, 1979), (consolidated for trial), the court reviewed Namen, 380 F. Supp. 452
(Namen I) and considered two new issues. The court adhered to all the findings and conclu-
sions in Namen I, and also concluded that (1) there has been no diminishment or disestab-
lishment of the Flathead Reservation; and (2) the Tribes do not have the authority to
regulate the riparian rights of the Namens, the City of Poison, or the State of Montana.
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